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1. Introduction
It is no overstatement to say that Pierre Bourdieu is one the most influential social-
scientific thinkers of the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st. 
Terms designed by him – ‘habitus,’ ‘field,’ ‘symbolic violence’ and so forth – have 
become part of the core vocabulary of anthropology, sociology, sociolinguistics, 
discourse analysis, cultural studies and media studies, to name just a few disciplines. 
Ignorance of his work is widely construed as a major intellectual flaw because 
‘French Theory,’ the complex of Anglosaxon scholarly interpretations of the work 
of Derrida, Ricoeur, Bourdieu and Foucault (Cusset 2008), is an important part of 
the canon of social sciences and humanities. The mediating effect of Anglosaxon 
uptake and interpretation is substantial: the history of translations of works by the 
French Mandarins can be shown to have an impact on how such work was read, 
understood and incorporated in general and specific theoretical projects worldwide. 
In Bourdieu’s case, Gorski (2013) notes that the sequence of English translations 
of Bourdieu’s books did not chronologically mirror their sequence in Bourdieu’s 
own development and that some of his work remains untranslated. Such factors can 
explain the lack of attention to Bourdieu’s ethnographic and historical ambitions in 
much secondary work. I shall have occasion to return to this issue below.
Given Bourdieu’s status, I have the comfort of assuming that most readers 
will be at least superficially acquainted with the baseline of his work in the field of 
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language (especially his Language and Symbolic Power, 1991), and focus on some 
perhaps less widely understood aspects of it that are of direct relevance to contem-
porary theorizing in the field of language in society. Three aspects, in particular, 
merit elaborate discussion: (i) Bourdieu’s theoretical investment in a post-ortho-
dox ‘new left’ Marxism and his deep interest in the ethnographic stance developed 
in American symbolic interactionism; (ii) his view of research methodology, in 
particular his ethnographic bias and the way in which that bias led to a continu-
ous ‘loop’ of ethnography and quantification; (iii) the way in which, throughout 
his oeuvre, Bourdieu sought to develop ‘nexus concepts’ such as habitus, where 
‘micro-’ and ‘macro-’ features coincide. All three aspects, I hope, can be seen as 
useful for addressing the phenomenology of contemporary social change and the 
role of language therein.
2. New Left foundations and symbolic-interactionist interests
The big questions addressed in Bourdieu’s work are clear, and Bourdieu himself was 
generous in spelling them out in prefaces to his major works, often as a story of 
cohesion between different parts of his oeuvre (see e.g. the prefaces to Distinction, 
1984, and The Logic of Practice, 1990). These questions demand some measure of 
erudition and insight into the intellectual history of the twentieth century, because as 
we shall see, Bourdieu sweeps up large chunks of theory and methodology reflection 
from various different branches of social sciences and humanities before he positions 
his own efforts. A great many of his theoretical and methodological concerns were 
aimed at answering the Marxian question that has kept much of twentieth-century 
intellectual history going: that of the relationship between “social being and social 
consciousness” – does ‘subjective’ consciousness shape the ‘objective’ world or is (as 
Marx claimed) the ‘objective’ world determining consciousness? Do humans shape 
the social conditions in which they live and the interests they draw from them, or 
are they shaped by them? Engagement with these issues, certainly after the Second 
World War and the appearance in print of Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks, defined (and 
defines) the so-called New Left as a ‘humanist’ Marxism that questions the simple 
mechanics of basis and superstructure of an earlier orthodoxy and searches for spaces 
of human agency and intellectual creativity as ‘objective’ forces of history.
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Much of what Bourdieu was concerned with in his oeuvre revolves around 
this: how exactly do we describe what Marx called ‘socialized humanity’ – indi-
viduals and communities that are deeply formed by the historical and social envi-
ronments in which they develop, the social structures they are part of and which 
they – here comes ‘habitus’ – have incorporated in such a way that it shapes their 
bodies, attitudes, thoughts and everyday behavior? How do we describe the patterns 
by means of which such forms of socialization emerge, operate, get reinforced or 
changed? And how do we, then, handle ‘objectivity’ and ‘subjectivity’ in scientific 
practice?
The answers to these questions required, for Bourdieu, an entire reconstruc-
tion of himself as a scientist and of the science he practiced. Showing the nature 
of the socialized subject, as described above, involved a challenge to scientific 
‘objectivity’ as then described and prescribed in Lévi-Straussian structuralism. 
As an anthropologist trained in this distinguished French tradition, Bourdieu had 
learned to turn the observed subject of anthropology into an ‘object’ of structur-
alist analysis by rendering the researcher (and his instruments) invisible. Lévi-
Straussian anthropologists were never ‘really there’ in research other than as an 
unchallengeable epistemic superior, a position Bourdieu found untenable in actual 
fieldwork (see Bourdieu 1990: 14; 2000: 23–25; Blommaert 2005a offers a discus-
sion). Instead, an ethnographic stance grounded in the practice of fieldwork in 
Algeria, on local economic issues, pushed him towards fundamentally different 
insights:
It was (…) because I found myself in a situation where I could 
directly observe the disarray or the distress of economic agents 
devoid of the dispositions tacitly demanded by an economic order 
that for us is entirely familiar […] that I was able to conceive the 
idea of statistically analyzing the conditions of possibility of those 
historically constituted dispositions.  (2000: 18)
Bourdieu had, thus, ethnographically encountered a contrast between “historically 
constituted dispositions”, one set determining how rural Algerians uncomfortably 
handled a capitalist economic system and another set determining his own habitu-
ated ways of going about economic aspects of life (cf. Wacquant 2005; Reay 2004; 
Blommaert 2005a). Two ‘habituses’ (we would now say) had clashed in fieldwork 
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interactions between an anthropologist and his ‘subject,’ since both occupied very 
different historically constituted ‘positions’ in the ‘field’ of economic behavior – 
the French intellectual had the habitus of a sophisticated habitué of such practices, 
the Algerian farmer that of a novice lacking many of the resources and skills long 
rendered ‘normal’ in the French intellectual’s way of life.
Very little of Bourdieu’s work can be understood unless we grasp this 
vital epistemological and methodological moment where Bourdieu breaks away 
from structuralism and moves towards what was to become ‘reflexive sociology.’ 
The move is grounded in ethnography, the realization of the fact that knowledge 
emerges not from one ‘objective’ partner interacting with a ‘subjective’ one, but 
from intersubjective engagement negotiating the ‘objective’ historically constituted 
positions from which each party acts and produces meaning (cf. also Fabian 1983). 
‘Subjects’ can be ‘objectively’ studied by recognizing their fundamental subjectiv-
ity, in itself grounded in and generated by objective social-historical conditions. 
These historically constituted positions, we can see, shape the ‘socialized subject’ 
Bourdieu wanted to describe: history in society has put all of us in a specific posi-
tion towards specific things and towards other people; this position can change 
as we live our lives, but its initial conditions are what they are – a point of depar-
ture which is never neutral but always covered with specific interests, preferences, 
habitual patterns of action, speech and understanding. It is in La Misère du Monde 
(1993) that this is clearest: through a large interview project in the working-class 
suburbs, he shows “the tragedy of the confrontation, without concession or possible 
compromise, of viewpoints that are incompatible because they are all grounded in 
social reason” (1993: 13, my translation).
This ethnographic and intersubjective streak in Bourdieu’s work is rarely 
identified as crucial in understanding his work (but see Hanks 2005). It not only 
helps us understand the large intellectual project he undertook; it also helps us 
understand his deep and active interest in the work of American symbolic-inter-
actionist sociologists such as Goffman, Garfinkel and Cicourel. The interest is not 
hard to justify, given the insistence of symbolic interactionists on observing every-
day lived experience in its ‘natural environment’ in order to “catch the process of 
interpretation from the standpoint of the acting person”, where this standpoint is 
defined as interactional, i.e. in terms of responses to and anticipations of the moves 
of others in social interaction (McCall and Becker 1990: 2–3, drawing on Blumer 
1969). The insistence of symbolic interactionists (especially those raised in the 
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tradition of the Chicago School of Sociology) on meticulous fieldwork and partici-
pant observation was another point of attraction for Bourdieu, since such fieldwork 
inevitably provoked an explicit (reflexive) questioning of the researcher’s role and 
showed the epistemic potential of such role-play in fieldwork in which the eth-
nographer was present, visible and salient as an actor in the process of knowledge 
construction.
Bourdieu emphasized these merits of symbolic interactionism in several of 
his writings, most notably in the obituary he wrote for Erving Goffman and the 
introduction to the last publishing effort he made in his lifetime: a French edition 
of several of Aaron Cicourel’s classic essays on interaction in medical practice 
(Bourdieu 1982; Bourdieu and Winkin 2002).1 Especially developments such as 
ethnomethodology and, later, cognitive sociology (Cicourel 1972) received acco-
lades from Bourdieu, who saw clear parallels between ethnomethodological con-
cerns and his own focus on ‘logic of practice’: the ways in which people interacting 
in social settings co-construct the realities they inhabit by means of habituated and 
socially ratified modes of thought and action adjusted to specific social fields. The 
difference he had with symbolic interactionism was made explicit in the opening 
pages of Language and Symbolic Power:
[…] although it is legitimate to treat social relations – even rela-
tions of domination – as symbolic interactions […] one must not 
forget that the relations of communication par excellence – linguis-
tic exchanges – are also relations of symbolic power in which the 
power relations between speakers or their respective groups are 
actualized. (Bourdieu 1991: 37)
In this book – Bourdieu’s most influential intervention on language – he subscribes 
to the fundamentally dynamic, practice-based and ‘emic’ approach to communica-
tion developed by the likes of Goffman, Cicourel and Garfinkel; but he couches it 
into a broader historical frame (making his approach effectively Bakhtinian, one 
could say) and designs his analysis of language in society through the theoreti-
cal vocabulary developed in The Logic of Practice (1990). Thus, social interac-
tion articulates socio-historically configured ‘positions’ from whence people speak; 
these positions are defined by a ‘market’ of symbolic capital in which resources are 
circulated and unevenly distributed, ensuring, for instance, that a ‘high’ Parisian 
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accent will be perceived as superior vis-à-vis a ‘low’ upcountry accent. The play 
of different positions in social arenas is the play of symbolic violence, or ‘mis-
recognition’ and ‘recognition’ of linguistic-communicative resources not because 
of their ‘linguistic’ features but of the sociohistorical load they carry within a given 
social field. Thus, in any social field, distinctions will emerge between ‘legitimate’ 
language (the ‘norm,’ one could say) and deviant forms of language. The target of 
Bourdieu’s critical efforts in Language and Symbolic Power is classical structural-
ism – Saussure, this time, with a polemical gesture towards Chomsky – and the 
instrument he uses for his critique is a blend of symbolic-interactionist ontology 
with his own unique historicizing methodology.
3. The Bourdieuan methodological loop
This blending of an ethnographically inflected ontology with a tendency to aim for 
larger, historically configured patterns of social structure, all of this often pitted 
against classical structuralist assumptions, yielded a remarkable research procedure 
in much of Bourdieu’s work.2 Let us take a closer look at his methodological toolkit.
Bourdieu started from an acute awareness of ‘framing’ in research. We all 
enter our research sites under particular sociohistorical conditions and they have an 
effect on what we see and perceive and understand. Bourdieu was aware of this dur-
ing his 1960s fieldwork in Algeria. The country had just passed through a traumatic 
war of liberation, and the impact on his fieldwork was considerable – former ene-
mies had to collaborate in research. In order to escape this bias, Bourdieu explored 
two measures. First, he emphasized the importance of revisiting the same object 
over and over again, of comparison (his work in Algeria was followed by ‘native 
ethnography’ in the Béarn) and expansion (including more materials than just those 
collected during fieldwork). Second, as we know, he turned to the kind of structural-
ism then advocated by Lévi-Strauss, in order to find a vantage point which allowed 
scientific objectivity. In doing this, like Lévi-Strauss, he intended to move from 
ethnography to ethnology – a search for transcontextual (or a-contextual) ‘driving 
principles’ in the social system observed, by focusing on correlations, contrasts 
and forms of systemic coherence. This ethnological tendency explains Bourdieu’s 
search for higher-level validity – his difference with symbolic interactionism.
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Whereas the first set of measures was maintained throughout Bourdieu’s oeu-
vre, the second set – the appeal to structuralism – was abandoned. The main reason, 
I repeat, was ethnographic experience. Bourdieu had encountered paradoxes, con-
tradictions and flexible potential in the field, rather than the strict, transparent and 
mechanic schemes of structuralism. Furthermore, and as we have seen above, he 
had experienced experience, so to speak: the fact that the distance advocated in eth-
nology is, in actual fieldwork conditions, overgrown with sharedness of meaning, 
joint understandings of ‘the logic of the game’ and so on. In other words, Bourdieu 
had ethnographically experienced that the ethnological claim to distance generates 
another, and a potentially more dangerous form of ethnocentrism than the intrin-
sic ethnocentrism of his own observer’s – but participating and co-constructing 
– role in ethnography (a point also extensively belabored in critical ethnography, 
e.g. Fabian 1983). Bourdieu worried about the specific role of the observer, and 
this role is not substantially different whether one investigates faraway Algeria or 
his home region in the Béarn. We have seen that he allowed himself to be deeply 
inspired by Goffman, Cicourel and other ethnographers in this respect. And this 
led to his rejection of Lévi-Straussian ethnology as “methodologically provoked 
anamnesis” (2000: 24) which suggests closure and total strangeness – absence of 
shared understanding – between observer and observed. From that point onwards, 
‘dispositions’ occur, and Bourdieu theorizes how he himself became part of the 
object – the objectification of subjectivity. This is also the point where he makes 
the shift from anthropology (or ethnology, see above) to sociology: a science in 
which precisely the objectification of subjectivity is central, and a science which 
can aspire to eventually develop a subject.
Bourdieu used extensive surveys as the backbone of some of his most 
impressive work. Distinction, for instance, presents its readers with the results of 
a large-scale series of survey studies in which aspects of subjective experiences of 
class structure were investigated. He had, however, grave reservations about ‘naïve’ 
statistical research – a point for which he found ample motivation in Cicourel’s 
(1964) classic critique of quantitative approaches in sociology (e.g. Bourdieu and 
Winkin 2002: 19). Distinction, that survey-driven study, is, remarkably, presented 
by Bourdieu as “a sort of ethnography of France” (1986: xi).3
Such statements in Bourdieu’s work are not frivolous; we know that they are 
fundamental methodological statements. As said, he invariably started from ethno-
graphic engagement in the field, where the confrontation of two social-historically 
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grounded forms of embodied subjectivity (habituses) provided the hypotheses to be 
statistically tested. The connection between ethnography and statistical analysis is 
clear:
[…] nothing had prepared me to understand the economy, espe-
cially my own, as a system of embodied beliefs, I had to learn, step 
by step, through ethnographic observation later corroborated by 
statistical analysis, the practical logic of the precapitalist economy, 
at the same time as I was trying as best as I could to figure out its 
grammar. (Bourdieu 2000: 24)
We have seen above where his tendency to aim for a ‘grammar’ – a generalization 
– came from: from structuralist ethnology. But generalization (the ‘grammar’ men-
tioned in the quote above), for him, should be empirical, not abstract, and reflect-
ing the on-the-ground realities detected in ethnography. And such generalizations 
would be built by statistical work entirely grounded in ethnographic observation 
– the questions would be ethnography-based – and framed in an ethnographic epis-
temology, that is: an awareness that outcomes of statistical generalization needed to 
be fed back to the empirical on-the-ground realities from which they emerged, and 
that they needed to speak to the ‘lived experience’ of everyday social engagements. 
Echoes of Cicourel’s (1964) famous statements on ecological validity are evident.
This created a loop: ethnography-statistics-ethnography-statistics and so 
forth. And this loop explains the other major feature of Bourdieu’s approach men-
tioned earlier: he would return throughout his career to the same field sites for 
ethnographic follow-up work. This move historicized his work: the loop in which 
ethnographic material was tested statistically and then brought into a new ethno-
graphic round of inquiry removed the synchronic bias of Levi-Straussian struc-
turalism and made Bourdieu’s object dynamic. His methodology, consequently, 
was one that addressed change rather than stasis. The acute historical awareness 
in Bourdieu’s work is the second point, along with his ethnographic epistemol-
ogy, that shines through in almost every major theoretical statement made by him. 
Consider his definition of habitus (Bourdieu 1990: 54):
[…] the structures characterizing a determinate class of conditions 
of existence produce the structures of the habitus, which in their 
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turn are the basis of the perception and appreciation of all subse-
quent experiences. The habitus, product of history, produces indi-
vidual and collective practices – more history – in accordance with 
the schemes generated by history.
The ethnographic grounding of Bourdieu’s approach removed the ‘snapshot’ (i.e. 
synchronic) quality from survey methodology and replaced it with a dynamic and 
change-oriented one.4 Note once more that the dynamic theory, lodged in his cen-
tral theoretical concepts, is generated by ethnography. Bourdieu moves from eth-
nographic generalization – his theory – to statistical generalization; the latter he 
qualifies as ‘corroboration’: statistical analysis enables him to grant his theory not 
just ecological validity but also representativeness. His level of generalization is no 
longer, contra Levi-Strauss, an ethnology grounded in universalist abstractions; it is 
an empirical (ethnographic) generalization, and this enables him to call Distinction 
with its many statistical data an ‘ethnography of France.’
4. Nexus concepts and language ideology: habitus
The preceding discussion already shows that simple and widespread scalar meta-
phors such as ‘micro versus macro’ are hard to apply to Bourdieu’s work. It is not as 
if statistics ‘just’ enables an extrapolation to a scale-level we usually call ‘macro,’ in 
contrast with ethnographic observation which would be ‘micro.’ Reading Bourdieu 
in these superficial and schematic micro-macro terms is invariably disappointing 
and risks missing the entire point.
A concept such as habitus is an attempt at ‘macro’ generalization at the level 
of what we would call ‘micro’ practices – let us call it a ‘nexus concept’ in which 
different scale-levels of social behavior are shown to be dialectically connected. 
Habitus shows itself in every social activity – we always embody the sociohistori-
cal realities that formed us as individuals who take specific (nonrandom) positions 
in a social field, with degrees of access to the material and symbolic capital that 
characterizes these positions, and the relationships of dominance or subordina-
tion they involve with others. The fact that these positions are being renegotiated 
over and over again in social encounters, that they can be negated or challenged 
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(as shown in e.g. Goffman 1971), and that they are dynamic and do change over 
time does not detract from the essential reproductive quality of social structures 
and the habituated characteristics they attribute to everyday social practice. While 
Reproduction (Bourdieu and Passeron 1970) emphasizes this reproductive systemic 
quality, Homo Academicus shows its potential for development and change over 
time: profound economic and political changes in the foundations in society also 
involve reshuffling the symbolic markets in society, they recreate its ‘culture,’ one 
could say, as an intrinsic part of these deep changes.
Language and Symbolic Power can be seen as Bourdieu’s most advanced 
argument in favor of this view, but note that in studies such as Academic 
Discourse (Bourdieu, Passeron and de Saint Martin 1965), Homo Academicus and 
Reproduction, developments in the discursive field were crucial evidence for the 
central thesis of symbolic capital reproduction and circulation: language usage is 
an extraordinarily sensitive indicator of actual social (‘macro’) relationships and 
their dynamics, and such ‘macro’ features occur across the entire field of language 
in society.5 The analysis is, as suggested earlier, Bakhtinian: Bourdieu sees words, 
expressions and discourses as filled with historically configured symbolic power 
features, in such a way that any aspect of speech can be seen as what Bakhtin called 
‘voice’ – an index of social positions within a given social status quo (Bakhtin 
1981; cf. Blommaert 2015). Thus, the country folk from the Béarn will, when talk-
ing to the ‘sophisticated’ Parisian, ‘lose voice,’ feeling insecure about pronuncia-
tion and lexical choice, leading to hypercorrection and self-stereotyping, out of an 
awareness that the Parisian’s French occupies a different, superior symbolic posi-
tion in the public order projected onto language usage.
A very similar argument (influenced more by Bakhtin than by Bourdieu) 
was made in Asif Agha’s major study on Language and Social Relations (2007; cf. 
also Kroskrity 2000; Collins and Blot 2003; Hanks 2005; Blommaert 2005b). Agha 
surveys linguistic-anthropological work on language ideologies, emphasizing the 
concept of ‘register’ as an ordered set of indexical (i.e. language-ideological) form-
function-effect mappings (Silverstein 2003). ‘Order’ here stands for the nonrandom 
character of such orders of indexicality: It is the skillful deployment of specific 
‘enregistered’ forms of speech in particular social arenas that sets the tone and key 
of interactions and indexically projects identities onto the speakers. An identity such 
as ‘wine connoisseur,’ for instance, demands the careful and sustained  deployment 
of specific jargons, genres and modes of talk about wine – a discourse indexing 
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someone as ‘wine connoisseur’ (Silverstein 2006). Violations of such orders come 
with a penalty: one is identified as ‘awkward,’ a ‘wannabe,’ a ‘dilettante’ or just a 
‘weirdo.’ The order is socially compelling since “recognition as (identity X)” is a 
socially regimented effect that demands recognizability within a frame of intersub-
jectivity. While, of course, various degrees of deviance can and do occur without 
heavy penalties, the deployment of specific registers impose a stereotypical ‘frame’ 
on interactions, the effects of which are relatively stable – registers are part of the 
stuff that constructs the benchmarks of social order (cf. also Rampton 2006).
Observe the obvious connection between Agha’s view of register and that 
venerable object of sociology that has been a central concern since Simmel and 
Durkheim: social norms, what it takes to be seen as socially ‘normal.’ Registers 
are conventional and therefore ‘normative’ of course, and in Agha’s view they are 
arrangements of behavioral features that, within given social arenas and social 
groups, count as understandable language. The echo of symbolic interactionism is 
evident here – norms are ‘emic’ and emerge out of intersubjective social interaction 
– and so is the parallel between this view and Bourdieu’s notion of ‘legitimate’ lan-
guage – something that emerges out of the dynamic of recognition and misrecogni-
tion. And observe how a notion such as language-ideological ‘register’ becomes, 
like habitus, a nexus concept in which the small stuff of everyday interaction is 
intrinsically colored, patterned and regimented by the ‘big’ stuff of culture, social 
structure and history (cf. Scollon and Scollon 2004; Silverstein 2004). While recog-
nizability – the crucial feature of register – is always uniquely and variably enacted 
in situated moments of interaction, it derives its effects from prior existence as an 
order of indexicality in which the deployment of certain features stereotypically 
points towards particular social categories and relationships (cf. Blommaert 2015). 
Register and processes of enregisterment, therefore, can be seen as the empirical 
aspects of habitus formation and development. The social order is incorporated, 
reproduced and amended, practically, in enregisterment.
This insight, I would argue, turns Bourdieu’s social-theoretical legacy even 
more into an ethnographic invitation, in which longitudinal and slow processes of 
social structuration can be read, followed and appraised, so to speak, through the 
lens of register development and change in actual moments of social interaction. 
‘Micro’-ethnographies of social interaction can be shown to directly (not by prior 
or posterior assumption) relate to ‘macro’-social and political relationships in non-
random ways, and patterns of shifting from one register into another (Goffman’s 
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‘footing changes,’ Agha 2005) can be understood as effects of the complexity of 
social environments in which people dwell, and as proof of the social versatil-
ity required from real people in real societies (cf. Silverstein 2004; Collins 2014; 
Rampton 2014). Sociolinguistically, this methodological line suggests important 
potential for revisiting ‘macro’-features of language in society such as language 
policies, now possibly seen as one set of norms amidst several other socially recog-
nizable ones, leading to language behavior which appears, from a formal language 
policy viewpoint, as a violation of rules but proves to be, upon closer inspection, 
perfectly ‘normal’ in view of the polycentric normative environment that charac-
terizes real and highly diverse social arenas (Blommaert 2005b, 2014; Blommaert 
and Rampton 2011). At the same time, this view suggests a profound critique of 
classical notions of ‘structure’ as stable and replaces them with a view of social 
life as governed and patterned by means of complex interplays of multiple and 
dynamic structures demanding a capacity to change and shift rather than a capacity 
for adherence to (fixed, singular and dominant) ‘rules.’
5. Conclusion: Bourdieu as inspiration 
Bourdieu’s work is canonical – his books are almost without exception classics. 
Whereas a degree of reverence in reading them is expected (and perhaps desir-
able), the classic status of such work invites continuous re-reading, updating and 
reappraisal in view of recent insights. Real classics, in that sense, are works that 
continue to be relevant not as a fixed codex but as a flexible source of inspira-
tion, allowing exploratory confrontation with new relevant data, methodologies and 
theoretical concepts.
What contemporary scholars of language and society can take from 
Bourdieu’s work is the fundamental insight that language can be approached from 
the viewpoint of society, as an extraordinarily sensitive index of social relationships, 
processes and developments. I have pointed above to the ways in which Bourdieu 
used discursive data as key evidence for change in the social system – the central 
plot of Homo Academicus is the shift in the social and cultural composition of 
French academic infrastructures. Ethnographic and discursive data did what main-
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stream statistics could not achieve: they identified the effective locus of change 
in actual, situated nonrandom social behavior, and his usage of statistics was in 
that sense a technique of confirmation and double-checking of what ethnographic 
and discourse-analytic data had established (yielding, in the process, additional 
ethnographic questions). He stood, in this respect, shoulder by shoulder with his 
American friends and colleagues, Goffman, Cicourel and Garfinkel. And he took 
their efforts further into the direction of ‘macro’-social generalization by means of 
nexus concepts such as habitus, providing a theory of Marxian ‘socialized human-
ity’ as a matter of actual practice, governed and regulated by historically configured 
(but dynamic) dispositions that circumscribed the possibilities and limitations of 
social practices within specific fields.
This achievement is formidable, even if in many respects incomplete and 
unfinished, and even if drawing these fundamental insights from Bourdieu’s work 
demands hard reading, not just of Language and Symbolic Power but of large parts 
of the entire oeuvre. He did, indeed, establish sociology on a different footing, 
providing a fundamental set of images of man and society deeply different from 
those advocated by Durkheim, Weber, Parsons or Lévi-Strauss. Bringing recent 
advances in sociolinguistic and discourse-analytical analysis and theorizing within 
the framework of these images of man and society is both a challenge and an 
opportunity hard to dismiss for creative and innovative scholarship on language 
in society.
Notes
1. The patterns of referencing in Bourdieu’s work are also telling. While his universe 
of referencing is clearly dominated by the likes of Lévi-Strauss, Durkheim, Weber 
and other major scholars from the French structuralist canon, references to Goffman, 
Garfinkel and Cicourel are hard to overlook in Bourdieu’s work. 
2. The following paragraphs are adapted from Blommaert (2005a) and Blommaert and 
van de Vijver (2014). I refer the reader to the latter source for a more elaborate discus-
sion of the potential of the Bourdieuan methodological loop.
3. Bourdieu was usually generous when it came to inform his readers about the types 
of data he used in his research, and reading the appendices to works such as Homo 
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Academicus is worth the trouble for those who wish to explore the highly unorthodox 
ways in which he built his arguments, seen from a conventional sociological stance. 
Bourdieu uses large quantities of popular published data – newspaper articles, “rank-
ings” and “pop polls”, gossip stories and so forth – as well as lengthy interviews in 
preparing the grounds for statistical extrapolation, and some seriously good discourse 
analysis precedes that quantitative stage of work. See Hanks (2005) for comments on 
this point.
4. The “schemes” mentioned by Bourdieu fit into the category of notions such as 
“genre”, “register” etc. (see below). In fact, it is on the basis of such notions, all refer-
ring to the partly systemic (structured) nature of human conduct, that ethnographic 
generalizations are made.
5. Hanks (2005) offers an insightful review of Bourdieu’s focus on language practices 
in support of his larger conceptual efforts, notably in the development of the concepts 
of habitus and field.
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